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Abstract: 
This paper evaluates the degree of social mobility in Bolivia, both by 
comparing to other Latin American countries, and by comparing social 
mobility at different points in time. While Bolivia had one of the lowest 
levels of social mobility in the region in 1997, the last 10 years have seen 
spectacular improvements, especially for rural and female teenagers. This 
is very good news, as it suggests that Bolivia has finally escaped the low 
mobility – low growth equilibrium where it has been stuck for so long. 
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The Lorentz curve and its corresponding Gini coefficient is often used to describe  how 
unequal a country’s income distribution is, and a high Gini coefficient is almost universally 
considered a sign of an unfair, and thus undesirable, outcome. 
 
However, the Lorentz curve is a very incomplete measure of the fairness of the income 
distribution, because it says nothing about how each person have arrived at their present 
location in the distribution nor about how long they are likely to stay there. A society where 
people move around in the income distribution during the course of their lives depending 
on their current activities (studying, working, raising children, travelling around the world, 
unemployed, retired, etc) is very different from a society where some people are born at the 
bottom of the distribution and they stay there all their life, and their children and grand 
children are also likely to stay there because they have few opportunities for changing their 
circumstances. 
 
Similarly, a country where half the population is poor all the time is very different from a 
country  where  the  whole  population  is  poor  half  the  time,  although  in  both  cases  the 
poverty  rate  would  be  50%.  In  the  latter  situation,  people  can  engage  in  consumption 
smoothing over time by running up savings in good times and running them down in bad 
times, and governments can engage in redistribution by transferring funds from people who 
are currently doing well to people who are currently not earning much. These options are 
not available in countries where it is the same people who are poor all the time, since the 
poor are always too poor to save and the rich will fight against a tax-system where they 
always have to pay and never will receive.  
 
In  order  to  really  understand  how  unfair  an  income  distribution  is,  it  is  necessary  to 
understand  the  dynamics  behind  it.  It  is  necessary  to  understand  whether  people  have 
arrived at their current position in the distribution due to their own efforts--or lack therof--
or due to circumstances entirely beyond their own control (Roemer, 1998). That is, it is 
necessary to know about the degree of social mobility. 
 
Social  mobility  and  income  inequality  together  describe  the  “fairness”  of  an  income 
distribution. If income is very unevenly distributed and social mobility is low, then there is 
a large gap between rich and poor and there is little chance of crossing that gap. This is 
clearly an “unfair” situation. However, an unequal income distribution becomes much less 
worrisome if social mobility is high, because then it is relatively easy for poor families to 
improve their situation over time and over generations. 
 
While  income  inequality  measures  such  as  the  GINI  coefficient  are  used  widely  and 
frequently to characterize income distributions, the degree of mobility across the income 
distribution, which is potentially more important, is only rarely considered. The problem is 
that  social  mobility  is  very  difficult  to  measure  empirically  since  it  requires  repeated 
information on the same people at different points in time. Only a few countries have the 
kind of data that allow them to calculate transition matrices directly.  
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Fortunately, some methods have been developed lately that allow the estimation of social 
mobility from standard household surveys. One such method is employed in this paper, 
both in order to compare Bolivia with other Latin American countries, and to test whether 
social mobility in Bolivia has been improving with the considerable efforts made to make 
development in Bolivia more inclusive and provide previously excluded sectors of society 
with more opportunities.  
 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  the  theoretical 
literature on social  mobility. It shows that economies with high social  mobility tend to 
experience higher growth rates than economies with low social mobility. Section 3 provides 
empirical estimates of social mobility in Bolivia and other Latin American countries by the 
end of the previous century. It is shown that ten years ago Bolivia was clearly among the 
countries with the lowest level of social mobility in Latin America. Section 4 discusses the 
implications of such low social mobility. Section 5 applies the same method of estimating 
social mobility on Bolivian household surveys from 1997 and 2007 in order to test whether 
there has been an improvement in social mobility over the last decade. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. SOCIAL MOBILITY IN THEORY 
 
Several papers  have theoretically  analyzed the relationship  between social  mobility and 
economic  growth,  and  they  all  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  high  social  mobility  is 
associated  with  higher  economic  growth.  However,  the  direction  of  causality  and  the 
transmission mechanisms between mobility and growth differ between models. 
 
Raut (1996), for example, develops a signalling model of endogenous growth in  which 
innate  talents  and  education  levels  of  workers  drive  the  basic  scientific  knowledge 
accumulation in the economy. The innate talent of a worker is private knowledge and is 
distributed independently of the  individual’s  family  background. The education  level of 
workers acts as a signalling device for talents and it improves productivity as well. The 
optimal education for each worker is determined by his talent and his family background. 
Whether talented individuals are properly educated and are employed  in the appropriate 
technical sectors is determined by the perfectly competitive and unprejudiced employers’ 
beliefs about the relationship between talent and education level. 
 
The model generates multiple balanced growth paths, which differ in the degree of social 
mobility and the growth rate. If employers believe that education levels are determined 
primarily by family background and thus are a poor signal of innate talents, they will offer 
less attractive wage contracts, because their expected gain from the contract is lower than in 
the situation where education levels are perfect signals for innate talents. The lower wages 
induce young people to choose less education, which implies a less than optimal growth 
rate. 
 
The  optimal  equilibrium  is  called  a  growth-enhancing  separating  equilibrium.  In  this 
situation all children get appropriately educated no matter what their family background, 
and the employer can trust that any person with a certain education also has the right innate 4 
 
talents to go with it. In this situation all the innate talent in the economy is used optimally 
and growth is maximized. 
 
To  move  an  economy  from  a  low  social  mobility–low  growth  equilibrium  to  a  high 
mobility–high growth equilibrium will require a change in the employers’ self-fulfilling 
expectations about the importance of family background compared to the importance of 
innate talents. This can be done through government policy targeted at making the optimal 
education available for all children independent of their family background. This, in turn, 
requires a wide range of policy initiatives, ranging from pre-natal care to college loans. 
 
Another theoretical study by Hassler & Mora (1998) analyzes an economy with two types 
of individuals: workers and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are the ones that generate new 
ideas  and  new  technologies  and  make  the  economy  grow.  The  more  intelligent  the 
entrepreneurs  the  higher  the  growth  rate  of  the  economy.  Intelligence  is  randomly 
distributed  among  all  people.  With  low  social  mobility  the  current  generation  of 
entrepreneurs mainly consists of the children of the previous generation of entrepreneurs. 
From an intellectual point of view, they are a random sample of society’s entire population, 
and consequently, they have average levels of intelligence. The entrepreneurs are therefore 
not  particularly  innovative,  and  they  do  not  change  the  world  substantially.  The 
entrepreneurs do, however, confront economic challenges, and they learn from these and 
pass  this  knowledge  on  to  their  children.  This  is  sufficient  to  give  the  children  of 
entrepreneurs  the  slight  advantage  that  will  make  them  the  entrepreneurs  of  the  next 
generation. Consequently, the intelligence of entrepreneurs in an economy with low social 
mobility will remain on an average level, and the economy will grow only slowly. 
 
In an economy with high social mobility, on the other hand, the entrepreneurial class is 
formed by the most intelligent people irrespective of their family background. Since the 
entrepreneurs are very intelligent they can generate a lot of technological change and rapid 
growth. They thus make the world change rapidly, and the experience that they can pass on 
to their children thus depreciates so fast that it is of little or no value. The next generation 
of  entrepreneurs  will  thus  be  formed  by  the  intellectually  gifted  people  rather than  the 
children of entrepreneurs, since the children of entrepreneurs have no particular advantage 
in a rapidly changing world. This implies that the economy with high social mobility will 
enjoy consistently high growth. 
 
Several other papers show how the allocation of talent in an economy is important for the 
level  of  growth.  Murphy,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1991),  for  example,  show  that  when 
talented people are attracted to the productive sector, they create high growth, but if they 
instead are attracted to rent seeking activities, they create stagnation. Their model has an 
interesting implication regarding discrimination in a country where rent seeking is the most 
lucrative sector (which could be the case in Bolivia
1). If talented people are attracted to the 
                                                             
1 Transparency International, a global coalition against corruption, monitors corruption perceptions around the 
world. According to their most recent figures (Transparency International (2009)), Bolivia is number 120 out 
of 180 countries investigated. This is a relative improvement since 1997, where Bolivia was found to be the 
second most corrupt country in the world. 
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rent seeking sector because it offers the highest returns, then discrimination may actually 
cause higher growth. This is the case if a dominant group monopolizes access to the rent 
seeking sector, because then the intelligent people from the excluded population will have 
to work in the productive sector and thus generate at least some growth. 
 
In a related paper, Baumol (1990) argues that while it may be difficult for economic policy 
to affect the supply and quality of entrepreneurs, it may be possible to affect the allocation 
of  entrepreneurship  between  productive  sectors  and  unproductive  sectors,  such  as  rent 
seeking and organized crime.  
 
The implication of the above mentioned studies is that to achieve optimum growth it is 
important that  people  get to  work  in  the  sectors  where  they  are  most  productive.  This 
requires that young people’s educational and occupational choices be determined by talent 
and not limited by family background. That is, it requires high social mobility. But this is 
not a sufficient condition. It also requires that productive activities yield higher returns to 
talent  than  unproductive  rent  seeking  activities.  If  talent  is  attracted  to  rent  seeking 
activities rather than productive activities, then no amount of social mobility can generate 
growth. 
 
Interestingly,  the  level  of  social  mobility  can  be  strongly  influenced  simply  by  the 
perceptions  about  social  mobility  (e.g.  Alesina  &  Angeletos,  2005;  Bénabou  &  Tirole, 
2006).  If  people  perceive  that  anybody  can  become  successful  no  matter  what  their 
background  (e.g.  “The  American  Dream”),  then  they  are  more  likely  to  engage  in  the 
activities  that  actually  might  make  them  successful  (studying,  working,  inventing, 
investing, etc.), whereas people who think they have no chance of improving are unlikely to 
expend the effort it takes to succeed, thus creating a situation of self-fulfilling negative 
expectations.  
 
This expectations-based mechanism could potentially be important in Bolivia, where a very 
large segment of the population for centuries have felt excluded and with few opportunities, 
but now suddenly observe that even poor people with only rudimentary education have 
made their way into top positions.    
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF SOCIAL MOBILITY IN BOLIVIA 
 
There  have  been  several  previous  attempts  at  estimating  social  mobility  in  Bolivia 
(Behrman, Birdsall & Székely, 1998; Dahan & Gaviria, 2001; Andersen 2001; Andersen 
2003;  Mercado  &  Leitón-Quiroga,  2009).  All  of  these  studies  use  standard  household 
surveys, since there are no panel data sets available that cover the same families in Bolivia 
over time. 
 
The basic idea behind all four studies is to measure how important family background is in 
determining the educational outcomes of young people. If family background is important 
in determining young peoples’ educational level (and through that future income levels) 




Behrman, Birdsall  & Székely (1998), Andersen  (2001) and Mercado & Leitón-Quiroga 
(2009) measure the influence of family background directly in regressions with schooling 
gaps as the dependent variable and family background variables as explaining variables. 
Dahan & Gaviria (2001), on the other hand, measure the influence of family background 
indirectly by calculating the correlation of schooling gaps between siblings. 
 
The advantage of the Dahan & Gaviria social mobility index is that it does not require the a 
priori definition of what family attributes are important (e.g. mother’s education, family 
wealth, parental attitudes, etc.) Their index controls for all influences that are common to 
all children in the same family. The disadvantage is that at least two siblings in the relevant 
age range are needed for each family. This implies a dramatic reduction in the sample of 
young people. Worse, the ones that are left out are unlikely to be similar to those that are 
included in the analysis, since teenagers with many siblings are much more likely to be 
included. 
 
Andersen (2001) provides some refinements and improvements to the method proposed in 
Behrman, Birdsall & Székely (1998). First, the method for determining the importance of 
family  background  (Fields’  decomposition  (see  Fields  1996))  is  scale-independent,  so 
results do not depend on, for example, the currency in which income is measured. This 
allows  for easy comparison across countries and regions. Second, the  method does not 
require the provision of weights for the different family background variables. Third, the 
method  allows  single  parent  households  to  be  included  in  the  analysis,  because  the 
maximum of mother’s and father’s years of education is used rather than both at the same 
time.  Fourth,  Andersen  (2001)  provides  confidence  intervals  for  all  social  mobility 
estimates, so that the reader can see whether different measures are actually statistically 
different. Fifth, in the case of Bolivia, Andersen (2001) provides national estimates, while 
Behrman, Birdsall & Székely (1998) only includes urban Bolivia. 
 
Since  Andersen (2001)  is the only study that reports confidence  intervals on the social 
mobility estimates, these are the ones that will be used in this paper.  
 
Figure 1 shows the social mobility estimates for 18 countries in Latin America. The index 
is defined as one minus the importance of family background, implying that higher values 
of the index are associated with higher social mobility. The figure shows that Bolivia is 
among  the  least  socially  mobile  countries  in  Latin  America  together  with  Guatemala, 
Brazil, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru, on the other hand, 












Figure 1: Social Mobility Index for Teenagers (age 13-19 years),  
                with 95% confidence intervals 
 
Source: Andersen (2001). 
 
The widths of the confidence intervals reflect the sample sizes used to estimate the index. 
The estimate for Brazil is based on 11761 teenagers, which implies a relatively precise 
estimate. The estimate for Peru is based on only 2800 teenagers, which implies a much 
wider confidence interval. 
 
Other studies provide some support for this ranking. Behrman, Birdsall & Székely (1998), 
for example, also find that Chile has the highest level of social mobility in Latin America, 
whereas Brazil, El Salvador and Paraguay are among the least socially mobile countries 
investigated. For Bolivia, they only report results for the urban part, which clearly does not 
tell the whole story. The same is true for Dahan & Gaviria, but they confirm that Brazil and 
Honduras are in the low end of the range, while Chile, urban Argentina and urban Uruguay 
are in the top end. Ferreira & Gignoux (2008) only investigate 6 countries but also find that 
Brazil and Guatemala have less equality of opportunity than Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.  
 
 
4. CONSEQUENCES OF LOW SOCIAL MOBILITY 
 
The theoretical studies of social mobility discussed in section 2 explained one of the main 
problems with low social mobility, which is inefficient use of innate talent and thus lower 




















































































































































































very little incentive to study hard and work hard, if they know that the likelihood that it will 
improve their socio-economic status is low. Rich people do not have very good incentives 
either, since they were born rich and know that they will remain rich no matter how they 
spend their time. In order to provide good incentives for hard work and entrepreneurial 
activity, countries need a certain level of social mobility and numerous examples of poor 
people who have made great advances due to hard work and ingenuity. 
 
4.1 Economic Growth Rates 
 
Andersen (2001) finds a relatively strong positive correlation between Social Mobility and 
GDP per capita across 18 countries in Latin America, thus lending some empirical evidence 
to the theoretical arguments presented above. 
 
Figure 2 suggests that Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are located in high growth – high 
social mobility equilibria, while Guatemala, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Colombia are stuck in 
low growth – low social mobility equilibria (assuming that the higher GDPs are caused by 
higher long term growth rates). 
 
The correlation between GDP per capita and the Social Mobility Index is 0.53 across Latin 
American countries. The relatively strong correlation, however, does not imply anything 
about the direction of causality. It may be that low social mobility causes low growth, or it 
may be that low growth causes low social mobility. Low growth and low mobility may also 
be jointly determined as the theoretical models discussed in section 2 indicate. 
 
Figure 2: Social Mobility and GDP Per Capita 
 
Note: Argentina and Uruguay estimates are based on urban populations only. 





















































SMI based on teenagers (13-19 years)9 
 
 
Getting out of that low growth – low social mobility equilibrium should be a high priority. 
Not  only  would  Bolivia  likely  experience  higher  growth  rates  if  social  mobility  is 
increased,  it would probably  be good quality growth  in the sense that  it would  have a 
relatively large impact on inequality and poverty. 
 
5.2 Inequality and Poverty 
 
In countries where social mobility is high and people often marry outside their own class, 
consumption patterns are likely to be more equal than in countries with low social mobility 
(Kremer, 1996). This is so because people who have become rich either through education 
or through marriage are likely to help support their poorer relatives. If the rich and the poor 
are  separated  through  low  social  mobility,  such  sharing  is  less  likely  to  occur  and 
consumption patterns will be more unequal. 
 
Figure 3 shows that there is a very weak negative correlation between social mobility and 
income inequality ( = –0.12). Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, and Bolivia all have low social 
mobility and high income inequality. In these countries there is a large gap between rich 
and poor and there is little chance of crossing that gap. 
 
Figure 3: Social Mobility and Income Inequality 
Note: Argentina and Uruguay estimates are based on urban populations only. The GINI coefficients are from 
Székely and Hilgert (1999), and they are adjusted to be reasonably comparable across countries. 







































SMI based on teenagers (13-19 years)10 
 
Chile, Paraguay, and Argentina also have high gaps between rich and poor, but the chance 
of crossing the gap is substantially higher. This implies that the incentive structure in these 
countries is much better. 
 
While  low  mobility  and  high  income  inequality  is  clearly  the  worst  combination,  high 
mobility and low income inequality is not necessarily the best. High income inequality and 
high mobility (as in the case of Chile) may provide better incentives for people to study 
hard,  work  hard,  be  innovative,  and  take  risks,  because  the  returns  are  higher.  Better 
incentives  may  lead to greater growth in the  long run  because the work force is better 
motivated, better educated, more innovative, and less dependent on social safety nets. 
 
 
5. RECENT CHANGES IN SOCIAL MOBILITY IN BOLIVIA 
 
Mercado & Leitón-Quiroga (2009) is to date the only study which has investigated changes 
in Bolivian social mobility over time. Their study compares the Social Mobility Index of 
urban Bolivia in 1993 to that of urban Bolivia in 2003-2004, both using a slightly modified 
version of the Andersen (2001) methodology. They find improvements over time for all 
urban  teenage-groups,  except  indigenous  women.  By  far  the  biggest  improvement  is 
observed among indigenous males. 
 
The rest of this section will make a similar comparison of changes in social mobility  in 
Bolivia over time, but for the whole country, and for the period 1997 to 2007. 
 
5.1 Changes in schooling gaps 
 
The central variable for the analysis of social mobility is schooling gaps – or missing years 




Schooling gaps are defined as the age of the teenager minus 6 (normal school start age) 
minus years of education: 
 
  SGi = AGEi – 6 - EDUi 
 
In 1997, the average schooling gap for teenagers in Bolivia was 2.33 years, whereas by 
2007 this had dropped to 1.07 years. The drop is particularly large for rural areas, which 
had an average schooling gap of 3.76  years  in  1997 but only 2.00  in 2007. The drops 
among  male  and  female  teenagers  were  about  the  same,  both  ending  up  with  average 
schooling gaps very close to 1.07 years. 
 
                                                             
2 A teenager who has already left home cannot be included in this kind of analysis because of the lack of 
information about family background. But in Bolivia, only about 5% of teenagers are excluded from analysis 
because of this restriction. 11 
 
These numbers demonstrate that the Bolivian education system has become substantially 
better at keeping teenagers  in  school, suggesting that the enormous efforts on both the 
supply side and demand side are paying off. 
 
 
5.2 Schooling gap regressions 
 
The main tool to measure social mobility is a schooling gap regression, which indicates 
which  factors  explain  the  differences  in  schooling  gaps  between  teenagers
3.  If family 
background variables are important, social mobility is  considered low, since a teenager’s 
future  is  to  a  large  extent  determined  by  his  parents’  education  and  income  level.  In 
contrast,  if  the  family  background  variables  are  unimportant,  then  social  mobility  is 
considered high, because teenagers from different backgrounds have similar educational 
opportunities. 
 
Table 1 compares shows the regression results and the Field’s decomposition for Bolivian 
teenagers in 1997 and in 2007. In 1997, the maximum education of the parents is the most 
important variable explaining a teenagers schooling gap, accounting for 13.3% of the total 
variation in schooling gaps. By 2007, the importance of this family background variable 
had dropped to 8.8%. Similarly, in 1997 household income per capita was very important, 
explaining 7.0% of the variation in schooling gaps, whereas by 2007, the importance of this 
variable had dropped to 3.2%.  
 
In general, the explanatory power of the schooling gap model has decreased from an R
2 = 
0.3613 in 1997 to R
2 = 0.2589 in 2007. Thus, schooling gaps have both become smaller and 
less  predictable,  indicating  that  the  importance  of  unobserved  characteristics,  such  as 
intelligence, motivation and effort, have become more important, while family background 
variables beyond the control of the teenager, have become less important.  
  
Table 1: Schooling gap regressions and Field’s decompositions for 1997 and 2007 
























13.3  -0.0987 
(-6.8) 
8.8 
Age of head of household  -0.0049 
(-1.42) 
0.0  -0.0130 
(-3.50) 
-0.1 




0.0  -0.2097 
(-2.54) 
0.0 




0.0  0.3655 
(5.23) 
0.6 
Dummy younger sister  0.1104 
(1.19) 
0.0  0.1599 
(1.73) 
0.5 
                                                             
3 Please see Andersen (2001, 2003) for details on the methodology. 12 
 
Dummy younger brother  0.1129 
(1.31) 
0.0  0.0177 
(0.22) 
0.0 
Dummy older sister  0.0173 
(0.35) 
0.0  0.0713 
(0.74) 
0.0 
Dummy older brother  0.1296 
(2.17) 
0.0  0.1038 
(1.79) 
0.0 
Dummy female  0.1100 
(1.39) 
0.0  0.0407 
(0.54) 
0.0 
Age  0.3605 
(8.35) 
6.3  0.3005 
(8.73) 
6.7 
Dummy indigenous  0.1384 
(1.07) 
0.5  0.5351 
(2.64) 
2.5 
Dummy adopted  0.3503 
(2.16) 
0.1  0.1908 
(2.05) 
0.1 




-1.7  0.4453 
(2.13) 
-1.1 
Average regional education  -0.5594 
(-2.98) 
2.6  -0.3276 
(-2.97) 
1.9 
Dummy urban  -1.0382 
(-4.36) 
7.8  -0.4696 
(-1.80) 
2.9 
Constant  -1.1259 
(-1.06) 
0.0  -1.3426 
(-1.19) 
0.0 
  #obs = 5444  R
2 = 0.3613  #obs = 2475  R
2 = 0.2589 
Source: Author’s estimation based on household surveys from 1997 and 2007. 
Note: the Factor Inequality Weights from the Fields’ decomposition can be interpreted as each explanatory 
variable’s contribution to explaining the total variation in the dependent variable. 
 
 
5.3 The Social Mobility Index 
 
The results from the schooling gap regression can be used to calculate a Social Mobility 
Index. Following Andersen (2001), we define the Social Mobility Index as 1 minus the sum 
of the Factor Inequality Weights associated with the two family background variables: 
 
SMI = 1 – (FIWhhypc + FIWmaxedu) 
 
Thus, for 1997, the SMI is calculated as 1 – (0.0700+0.1316) = 0.7973. Likewise, for 2007 
we find an SMI = 1 – (0.0319+0.0879) = 0.8802. 
 
In order to find out whether the SMI from 2007 is statistically significant from the SMI 
from 1997, we estimate 95% confidence intervals around the point estimates using Stata’s 
bootstrapping  function.  The  results  are  illustrated  in  Figure  4,  which  suggests  that  the 
Social Mobility Index in 2007 is indeed significantly higher than in 1997. 
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Figure 4: Social Mobility Index for Bolivian teenagers, 1997 and 2007,  
                with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
 
 
5.4 Comparing social mobility in rural and urban areas 
 
Figure  5  compares  changes  in  SMI  between  1997  and  2007  for  urban  and  rural  areas 
separately. It is clear that the improvement in social mobility at the national level is mostly 
due  to  improvements  in  rural  areas,  which  have  seen  a  very  large  and  statistically 
significant improvement in social mobility from 0.82 in 1997 to 0.91 in 2007. Urban areas, 
on  the  other  hand,  have  only  experienced  a  smaller  and  statistically  insignificant 
improvement in social mobility. 
 





































Figure 5: Social Mobility Index for urban and rural teenagers,  
                1997 and 2007, with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
 
 
5.5 Comparing social mobility for male and female teenagers 
 
Figure 6 compares changes in SMI between 1997 and 2007 for male and female teenagers 
separately. It is clear that most of the improvement in social mobility at the national level is 
due to improvements for girls, which have seen a very large and statistically significant 
improvement in social mobility from 0.77 in 1997 to 0.88 in 2007. Boys, on the other hand, 
have  experienced  a  much  smaller  and  statistically  insignificant  improvement  in  social 
mobility. 
 
This result is quite interesting, since male and female teenagers in both years had the same 
average schooling gap, and thus the same reduction in schooling gaps. This indicates that it 
is  not  simply  the  general  reduction  in  schooling  gaps  that  drive  the  increase  in  social 


















































































Figure 6: Social Mobility Index for male and female teenagers,  
                1997 and 2007, with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
 
 
5.6 Comparing social mobility for indigenous and non-indigenous teenagers 
 
Figure  7  compares  changes  in  SMI  between  1997  and  2007  for  indigenous  and  non-
indigenous teenagers separately. Teenagers are considered  indigenous if they  learned to 
speak  in one of the indigenous languages of Bolivia, whereas they are considered non-
indigenous if they learned to speak in Castellano or a foreign language. This is thus a rather 
strict definition of indigenous, as many people might consider themselves indigenous even 
if  they  grew  up  learning  Castellano.  By  this  strict  definition,  30%  of  teenagers  were 
considered indigenous in 1997 and 18% in 2007. 
 
From this figure it becomes clear that the improvement in social mobility at the national 



















































































Figure 7: Social Mobility Index for indigenous and non-indigenous teenagers, 1997 and 
2007, with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
 
Although the groups become quite small, it is possible to calculate SMIs for indigenous 
males, indigenous females, non-indigenous males and non-indigenous females separately 
and still get statistically significant changes over time. 
 
Figure  8  shows  that  both  indigenous  and  non-indigenous  women  have  experienced 
significant  improvements  in  social  mobility  between  1997  and  2007,  whereas  neither 
indigenous males nor non-indigenous males have seen significant changes. 
 





































































































Figure 8: Social Mobility Index for indigenous and non-indigenous males, and indigenous 
        and non-indigenous female teenagers, 1997 and 2007, with 95% confidence intervals. 
 





This paper has shown that social mobility in Bolivia has increased dramatically between 
1997 and 2007, especially among rural and female teenagers. 
 
This is very good news, as low social mobility in Bolivia has for centuries constituted a 
formidable barrier to development, resulting in high and persistent poverty rates and low 
economic growth (e.g. Andersen, 2001; Mercado et al, 2002; Andersen, 2003; Azevedo & 
Bouillon, 2009). 
 
Some of this improvement is likely due to a change in perceptions about social mobility. 
Rural, indigenous teenagers frequently dropped out of school in the past because they did 
not perceive any opportunities for taking advantage of formal schooling. Now, on the other 
hand, they see people of similar modest backgrounds reaching very high and prestigious 
positions. Such real life examples of social mobility can cause mental barriers to tumble 
down, and motive teenagers to study, work and try to improve their lot. And simply by 
trying, they will dramatically improve their possibilities of succeeding, as well as contribute 































































































































































































































But part of the improvement is also due to the enormous efforts made by both the current 
and previous governments, with help from the international cooperation, to increase the 
supply  of  education  facilities  and  to  reduce  obstacles  against  school  attendance.  The 
benefits of all these investments in education are finally, thankfully, beginning to show, and 
it looks like Bolivia may have finally escaped the low mobility – low growth trap and is 
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